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America's 'Pacific Rim' Strategy
T H E  REASONS FO R  DISSENSION am ong A m erica’s rulers are 
clear. The war has destroyed the precious consensus while th reat­
ening to undermine the economy. Besides the th reat to  the dollar 
particularly from E uropean bankers, rising inflation, and a worsen­
ing balance of paym ents situation —  all aggravated by an economy 
fired up by military expenditures —  the very foundation of A m eri­
can international expansion, the superior productivity of the U.S. 
economy, has been eroded.
For more than a hundred years the United States has been a 
Pacific power. B ut since the end of W orld W ar II and the 
collapse of the British, French and Japanese empires, the United 
States has become the m ajor Pacific pow er.1 While the industrial 
nations rem ain the the largest trading centre for the United States 
and U.S. investment is increasing in Europe twice as fast as in the 
Pacific, trade is increasing in the Pacific faster than in Europe.
U.S. imperialism  in Asia has developed pecular characteristics 
which will determ ine the direction of future strategies in the area. 
Beginning with W orld W ar II economic thrusts have been accom­
panied and protected by an aggressive military presence. This fact 
has affected both the nature of economic relations in the Pacific 
Basin and the industrial development of the western United States. 
The United States’ peculiar form of international military Keynes­
ianism has stoked up the economies of the lesser Asian powers 
as well as Japan, producing a fatal dependency on the m aintenance 
of a massive military presence.
T his article appeared  in Leviathan  (US) of Ju n e  196!), and is republished here 
slightly abridged.
Peter Wiley is a revolutionary activist and m em ber of the San Francisco staff of 
/ rviathan.
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It is a m atter of common knowledge that del'enee spending has 
provided much of the dynamism for the Am erican economy since 
World W ar II. With much of this spending going to maintain an 
Am erican presence in Asia, military imperialism in Asia has played 
a significant role in the rapid expansion and internationalisaton of 
the Am erican economy. And now since the United States com ­
mitted itself to intervention in Vietnam , the very institutions which 
were generated by this expansion, particularly the multinational 
corporation, have begun to devise an imperial strategy consistent 
both with the traditions of U.S. imperialism  in Asia and with the 
global scope of their search for m arkets and resources. Beginning 
on the mainland of Southeast Asia, the corporations in the van­
guard of the movement for rationalisation and extension of the 
Pacific m arket are beginning to systematise and integrate the complex 
web of bilateral, multilateral and regional alliances which have been 
constructed in the Pacific since the war.
VIETNAM
The form ulation of a Pacific Rim strategy contributed to  a 
clarification and alteration of the role assigned to Vietnam. In 
1966 the United States saw Vietnam as another Greece or Korea. 
Upon successful completion of pacification, U.S. capital would 
move in and reconstruct the country tying its economy to the 
international market system. Henry M. Sperry, Vice-President of 
First National City Bank, outlined this strategy:
We believe that w ere  going to win this war. Afterwards you'll have a m ajor 
job of reconstruction on your hands. T hat will take financing and financing 
means banks . . .  It would be illogical to perm it the English and French to 
m onopolise the banking busines*u-'>teiHtt£-.South Vietnam 's economy is becoming 
m ore and m ore I 'n ited States oriented.
A m erican corporations as well as banks were already staking out 
their claims. Standard Oil, Caltex and Shell, for example, were 
working on a $19 million oil refinery. Vietnam  was being con­
sidered as more than a m arket for U.S. investments and a place 
where American-owned subsidiaries would purchase goods from 
parent plants in the United States. By reconstructing agriculture, 
particularly rice cultivation, Vietnam could resume its special role 
in the economy of the region by supplying rice to countries, with 
serious food shortages.
A lthough the Tet offensive of 1968 destroyed these plans by 
driving, the United States out of the countryside and into a few 
cities and fortified bases, the United States has no intention of 
withdrawing. As long as the United States is. militarily incapable 
of pacifying Vietnam, it must accept second best. R ather than a
111 AU STRAL IAN  LEFT REVIEW — AUG.-SEPT., 1970
politico-economic entity integrated into the Pacific economy, Vietnam 
is being developed as a military outpost, a key base in the defence 
perim eter which runs along, the edge of the Asian continent and 
is anchored in South Korea and Vietnam. Form er Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State G raham  M artin has described the United 
States as creating a “protective screen” in Southeast Asia. Bases 
like Cam Ranh Bay, recognised by all observers as a perm anent 
facility, will anchor this screen.
T H A IL A N D  AND INDONESIA
Behind this screen the United States is rapidly expanding its 
influence in Southeast Asia, focussing its attention prim arily on 
Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand is considered “the centre of 
political and economic stability in Southeast A sia” . In a real 
sense the United States is fighting in Vietnam to protect its interests 
in Thailand from the forces of revolutionary nationalism repre­
sented by the recently form ed (January, 1969) People’s Liberation 
Army of Thailand. W ith V ietnam  lost except as a military outpost, 
the United States is trying to  bring Thailand into the Pacific 
economy before the struggle there reaches the proportions of Viet­
nam. Between 1961 and 1967 the U nited Stat.Es bolstered the 
military dictatorship of General Thonom  K ittikachom  with $640 
million in aid, almost two-thirds of it military assistance. In return 
the Thai Governm ent reversed a tendency toward state control of 
the economy and opened the country to Am erican investment and 
to the investment of im portant U.S. allies like Japan. The govern­
ment provided tax holidays and guarantees against nationalisation 
and against restrictions on entry of foreign capital, repatriation of 
profits, and transfer of capital. In 1965 the D epartm ent of Com ­
merce listed 99 firms in which Am erican companies or individuals 
have a substantial direct capital investment in the form of stock, 
as, a sole owner, or as a partner. Present U.S. investment is 
estim ated at $195 million, with much m ore to  come. Among the 
im portant investors are Caltex, Chase M anhatten Bank, Esso, Fire­
stone Rubber, IBM , ITT , Forem ost Dairies, Bank of A m erica and 
Kaiser Aluminium. The last three are im portant W est Coast firms.
Am erican firms are primarily interested in Thailand’s raw m at­
erials. Thus Tenneco and Union Oil signed the first contract for 
exploration and future exploitation of the oil fields under the Gulf 
of Thailand,, while Standard of Indiana has constructed a $35 
million refinery. Union Carbide has invested $4.8 million to  extract 
tin concentrate and G oodyear has built three tyre plants to  tap 
Thailand’s extensive rubber supplies. M eanwhile large U.S. banks 
— M anufacturer’s H anover Trust, First National City, M organ G uar­
anty and B anker’s T rust— are moving into T hai finance.
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Two other forms of economic activity are significant. Many 
large Japanese and American corporations are taking advantage of 
their increased international character in order to locate labor 
intensive industries and parts plants in areas where labor is cheap. 
In this way consum er goods and light m anufactures can be produced 
cheaply and exported to domestic assembly plants. Parts can also 
be assembled abroad for the local m arket. A nother type of activity 
is the actual construction of the defence perimeter. Utah Mining 
and Construction, a large international firm located in San F ran­
cisco. is building military bases in Thailand which are being used 
to bomb Vietnam. U tah’s involvement in the military aspects of 
U.S. expansion in the region in instructive. M arriner Eccles, 
chairm an of the board, has been a vocal critic of the war in Vietnam, 
a fact that has not prevented Utah from contributing to its extension.
Beyond Thailand is Indonesia, one of the richest regions and 
largest single markets in the world. American companies have 
literally swarmed into Indonesia since the coup against Sukarno 
although the chaotic state of the economy has proved a significant 
barrier to investment. President Eisenhower explained the relation­
ship between the struggle in Vietnam and Indonesia as early as 
1953 when he asked, “ If we lost Vietnam and M alaya, how would 
we. the free world, hold the rich em pire of Indonesia?’’
Since large-scale U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Indonesia has been 
redeemed for the “ free world". With the coup against Sukarno in 
1966 the trend of growing hostility toward foreign capital was 
arrested and a more pliable governm ent “came into existence’’. 
Within six months of its advent the new government returned 
expropriated property to its form er owners and promulgated a new 
law on foreign investment. The law provides virtual exemption 
from taxation for new foreign investors and makes no provision for 
joint ventures, one method which is usually employed in an effort 
to retain some local control of foreign investors. President Suharto 
sum m ed up the attitude of the new government toward foreign 
investors when he reassured Prime M inister Sato of Japan  that 
Indonesia will “never interfere in the affairs of private business 
organisation in Indonesia."
Soon after the coup and the counter-revolutionary bloodbath 
which killed hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, the United 
States extended aid to the new regime. Aid is now being followed 
by the preliminary forays of Am erican investors. American Free­
port Sulphur is opening a $76.5 million copper mine while U.S. 
Steel. Bethlehem, Kaiser Aluminium (among others) are also inter­
ested. American oil companies are just beginning to investigate
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Indonesia's rich deposits although they are still ham pered by a 
residue of nationalism from the Sukarno regime; the government 
insists on receiving 65 per cent of the net returns. Fifteen A m eri­
can banks, including Bank of America. Chase M anhattan and First 
National City have received authorisation to open offices. They 
are participating in the formation of a national investment bank 
which will give them a large measure of control over Indonesian 
finances.
Raw m aterials bring most investors to Indonesia and the economy 
is well on its way to becoming an extractive industry-plantation 
type of neo-colony. A lthough the Dutch were able to explore only 
a tenth of Indonesian resources, and the Sukarno regime did not 
get much further, potential investors know that the islands abound 
with oil, tin, copper and many other im portant m aterials as well as 
tim ber and the most fertile lands in Asia. By the middle of 1968 
the government approved foreign investment projects totalling 
$332.08 million, with a five year goal of $2.5 billion. More than 
three-quarters of these projects were concentrated in mining, planta­
tions, forestry, and fishing. Projects totalling $57.8 million were 
approved for manufacturing. Of the total am ount a little over a 
third were U.S. investments and the next two investors were listed as 
Canadian and South Korean, but the companies are in fact subsi­
diaries of U.S. corporations. Thus, almost two-thirds of the planned 
investment in Indonesia will be American-owned.
JAPAN
Although our attention is concentrated on Vietnam  and Southeast 
Asia due to the prolonged military confrontation there, Japan is 
in fact the pivot of the United States’ economic and military offen­
sive in Asia. Japan, and island bases like Okinawa, have been the 
most im portant forward staging areas in two U.S. interventions, 
Korea and Vietnam. Japan  is industrialised, seemingly stable poli­
tically, and often a willing partner in U.S. expansionist designs. 
Japan is the second largest m arket in the world after Canada 
for U.S. goods, the largest m arket for U.S. agricultural goods, and 
an im portant target for U.S. investors and exporters who so far have 
been prevented from penetrating the Japanese economy like they 
have the European.
But Japan  presents a problem and the solution of the problem 
is perhaps one of the most im portant reasons for the United States’ 
continuing presence in Southeast Asia. Japan  is an island economy 
with a small resource base, a rapidly growing population, and a 
domestic m arket that is limited in relation to the rapidly expanding 
productive capacity of its modern economy. In order to keep up
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its present rate of economic growth it must have larger and larger 
foreign markets and supplies of raw materials. Because of the 
importance of Japan to the United States in the Pacific, the United 
States, since the occupation, has assumed a great deal of responsibility, 
for managing the expansion of the Japanese economy as well as its 
own. Eisenhower explained in 1954 that the loss of Indochina 
"would take away that region Japan  must have as a trading area, 
or it would force Japan to turn tow ard China and M anchuria, 
or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible 
consequences of the loss of Japan to the free world are just incal­
culable” .
The possibility of reorientation toward China and Russia is 
strong if not “natural” . China and Russia are Japan ’s logical 
trading partners for reasons of transportation cost and economic 
specialisation. Prewar Japanese imperialism was based largely on 
the com plem entary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies. 
China provided a market for Japanese textiles and industrial goods 
and at the same time supplied im portant raw m aterials like cotton, 
iron ore, and coal while helping to  feed the Japanese population 
with rice and soya. Ideology and pressures from the United States 
have not prevented the Japanese from trying to  re-establish this 
trade pattern since the Cold W ar. Trade grew rapidly in the 
fifties, was slowed down by Chinese political opposition in the late 
fifties, and began to pick up again until the C ultural Revolution. 
The future of Sino-Japanese relations is unsure at this point although 
Japanese businessmen feel that trade with China this year will 
pick up perhaps equalling the record level of 1966. In addition 
Japan  in involved in several joint ventures with Russia in eastern 
Siberia designed to develop the resources of the area.
The United States is clearly wary lest Japan  first reorient its 
trade policy and then follow this change with a more independtent 
political stance in all of Asia. T o  prevent this reorientation the 
United States is encouraging Japan  to  re-establish its relationship 
with the Southeast Asian region of its form er East Asian Copros­
perity Sphere, while directing the rest of its overseas economic 
activities toward the West. Southeast Asia is already providing 
im portant raw materials for Japanese industry (bauxite from T hai­
land, oil from Indonesia) and' will provide more in the future as 
long as the Southeast Asia countries are amenable to  the exploitation 
of their resources by the new and old colonial masters. Until 
recently, however, the region did not live up to Japan ’s expectations 
as a m arket for goods and investment. Japan  turned instead to 
the United States, C anada and A ustralia and began to develop 
new m arkets and sources of raw m aterials in Latin America. 
Japanese foreign investment in the “underdeveloped” countries is
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presently shifting away from Latin Am erica and tow ard Southeast 
Asia, particularly the United States’ neo-colonial dependencies, 
Taiwan. K orea and Thailand. Despite this shift, 26 per cent of 
Japanese foreign investment in 1968 was in Latin Am erica while 
only 14 per cent was in other Asian countries.
Significantly, the United States has provided a surrogate m arket 
for Japan in Asia which helps to keep Jap an  out of the Chinese 
or Soviet trade orbit. From  1945 to 1962 U.S. military expenditures 
in Japan contributed significantly to the G N P and paid for nearly 
20 per cent of Japanese imports, a very im portant factor' in a 
country which until the recent boom has had chronic balance of 
payments problems due to the necessity to import large quantities 
of goods. In addition, U.S. military involvement has provided the 
markets that Japan  needs in the “underdeveloped” countries of Asia. 
The Japanese economy has thrived off the export of goods to  Korea, 
Vietnam, Thailand and other Am erican outposts. The im pact of 
the escalation of U.S. military involvement on the Asian m ainland 
can be illustrated both by the Korean war which initiated the 
Japanese economic “m iracle” and by the way the economy began 
to accelerate with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. In 
1965-66 the G N P rose 2.7 per cent, in 1966-67, in comparison, it 
rose by 7.5 per cent, reaching a fantastic 10 per cent in 1968.
The relationship between the tem po of Japanese economic devel­
opment and U.S. military involvement is more com plicated than  a 
simple accelerating effect from the U.S. military expenditures in 
Japan and Asia. Both the Korean and Vietnamese interventions 
caused rapid upswings in the U.S. domestic economy, the largest 
m arket for Japanese goods, which in turn stim ulated the Japanese 
economy. In  general, Japanese economic health is tied in large 
part to U.S. m ilitary adventures.
T H E  STRA TEG Y
The corporations in the forefront of Pacific economic expansion 
see the developm ent of a Pacific Rim strategy as the key to 
orienting Southeast Asia and Japan tow ard the W est and integrating 
them into a m arket system under U.S. hegemony. O perating 
through their research arm, the Stanford Research Institute, these 
corporations (Kaiser, Union Oil, Bechtel, Bank of America, Castle 
and Cook, U tah Construction and Mining, and Tenneco, to name 
a few) began to articulate a conscious strategy beginning in 1967 
as an outgrowth of their expanded activities in the area.
At the core of the Pacific system, as they see it, are the advanced 
industrial nations, Japan and the United States, and the three 
industrialising nations, Australia, C anada and New Zealand. The
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greater part of the flow of trade and investment is between these 
countries and is based on a certain degree of specialisation. The 
United States trades with all the nations exporting a wide variety 
of goods, most im portant of which are raw materials, agricultural 
goods, consum er durables and capital goods. In addition the 
United States has invested and will continue to invest in all the 
Asian countries, with particular emphasies on Australia and Japan, 
where direct U.S. investment is presently not welcome. Australia 
and to a lesser extent New Zealand export raw m aterials and 
agricultural goods largely to Japan. In Australia, raw materials in 
particular are being developed for sale in Japan with Japanese 
and Am erican capital. Japan produces textiles and a great variety 
of consum er and capital goods for the same markets as the United 
States, while also investing wherever possible.
The United States and then Japan stand at the apex of the 
hierarchy of economic development. They draw resources from the 
next tier, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while selling goods 
in these markets. These advanced countries, moreover, regard 
the integration of the neo-colonial countries around the Pacific 
Rim into their triangular and quadrilateral economic relations as 
essential to the future development of an international division of 
labor in the Pacific. First, because the neo-colonial countries arc 
at a very low level of development, their growth could be spectacular 
and  their potential as markets far greater than advanced countries. 
Sccond, the advanced countries view the raw materials of these 
countries as increasingly im portant to  their economic well-being. 
SR I-International Vice-President Ed Robison explained, “The 
raw m aterials that enable the rich countries to grow richer must 
increasingly be bought from the poor. The industrialised nations 
are using these basic materials in geometrically increasing quantities.
. . . We are . . . forced to  scour the world to  find out sources. . 
Finally, Southeast Asia and Latin Am erica have a special sig­
nificance. as we have described, for the United States’ ally, Japan.
The need to “scour the world” for raw  m aterials has provided 
the impetus for bringing western Latin Am erica and western Canada 
into the Pacific pattern of trade, tying the eastern Pacific to  the 
western Pacific. The United States has been exploiting the resources 
of both C anada and western Latin Am erican countries like Chile and 
Peru for quite a while. Now elaborate international agreements are 
being made in conjunction with Japan to  expand these operations 
in order to meet Jap an ’s soaring needs for raw materials.
The activities of U tah Mining and Construction, a m ajor Pacific 
Rim corporation and affiliate of SRI, are typical of the complex 
international relationships developing around the Pacific Rim be­
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tween the United States and Japan. Utah owns a controlling share 
ot M arcona Mining. M arcona invested in the exploitation of iron 
ore in Peru in 1956. Now the ore is exported to Japan  in ships 
constructed for M arcona in Japanese shipyards. The ships then 
n;ove on to Indonesia and the Persian Gulf, returning to the W est 
Coast of the United States with oil. In 1967, M arcona began 
exporting alumina from western Canada with a fleet of Japanese- 
built ships. In A ustralia, U tah is em barking on a joint venture 
with Mitsubishi, one of Japan ’s corporate giants. Together they 
have paid  SI 12 million (U tah put up 85 per cent of the capital) 
to explore 1333 square miles in Queensland for coal. The coal 
will be moved to the coast on a railroad built by the Governm ent 
of Queensland and will then be shipped to Japan in Japanese-built 
ships. When U tah’s construction of military bases in Thailand is 
taken into account we have a full picture of an expansive Pacific 
Rim corporation profiting from the extension of the military 
perim eter on the A sian m ainland and from the exploitation of raw 
materials behind this perimeter.
Along with the form ulation of a conscious strategy for the Pacific, 
the United States has initiated or participated in a great variety of 
arrangements and institutions designed largely to “ internationalise" 
protection of existing investments and facilitate further investment 
mainly in the less developed areas. Some of these arrangem ents are 
international in character; others serve as a convenient cover for 
U.S. control. Forem ost among the institutions is the Asian Develop­
ment Bank (ADB) founded in 1966.
A nother im portant aspect of the internationalisation involved in 
the Pacific Rim  strategy is the beginnings of military involvement 
by the other advanced Pacific nations particularly in Southeast 
Asia. In January, 1969, the Japanese began to send destroyers 
from its so-called M aritim e Self-Defence Force into the M alacca 
Straits between M alaysia and Indonesia. The next m onth Australia 
and New Zealand announced that they will maintain forces in 
M alaysia and Singapore in anticipation of British withdrawal east 
of Suez in 1971. The United States has put great emphasis on 
the internationalisation of the Vietnam intervention by forcing its 
more servile allies like South Korea to send troops. When revo­
lutionary nationalism  becomes generalised in Southeast Asia, which 
is only a m atter of time, the United States will have its imperialist 
co-partners at beck and call.
IM PER IA LIST  CUL-DE-SAC
Despite the immense sophistication of the international corpora­
tion. and the overwhelming strength of the Am erican military state,
the success of the Pacific Rim strategy is far from a foregone con­
clusion. Indeed it is subject to pressures from without and within, 
due largely to the growth of revolutionary nationalism  on the one 
hand and com petition in the international economy on the other.
The consequences of the continued colonisation of the third 
world are apparent: China, Algeria, C uba and Vietnam are all 
responses to the continued expansion of W estern capitalism. A t 
the same time the W estern powers are incapable of learning the 
lesson of repeated defeats at the hands of revolutionary nationalism. 
This is more true in Asia than anywhere else. Through vast 
geopolitical arrangem ents like the Pacific R im  strategy the interna­
tional corporations are consciously generating the conditions that 
lead to revolution. SRI, for example, explains that “ In the colonial 
era, the export of tropical products from Southeast Asia was a 
cornerstone of the world trading system. The dem and for these 
products, and for minerals, is still increasing year by year. It is 
still true that a country gains by exporting the products in which 
it has the greatest com parative advantage” .
The kind of insistence on repeating w hat has been proved to be 
self-destructive is responsible for the internationalisation of the 
anti-colonial revolt in Southeast Asia. A t present guerrilla struggles 
are taking place in Laos, Thailand, Burm a, India, Indonesia, M alaysia 
and the Philippines. Some of these are just beginning (India and 
B urm a), others were thought to have been term inated but are 
springing up again (Philippines and M alaysia), still others are 
emerging as m ajor confrontations (Laos and Thailand).
Unable to deal with the conditions that breed revolutionary 
resistance, the corporations m ust opt for counterinsurgency, a disas­
trous course because once the struggle has sufficient roots counter­
insurgency can only contribute to  its growth. In Thailand where 
guerrillas are fighting in three separate areas, the struggle has 
reached the stage where the local militias have been consolidated 
into a People’s Liberation Army. For several years the U nited 
States has been supplying the Thai “police” with a great variety 
of m aterial including weapons, helicopters and patrol boats. W ithin 
the last two years Am erican pilots have been “advising” Thai pilots 
on missions against the guerrillas. There are presently about 50,000 
U.S. troops in Thailand. V irtually all the elements of another 
Vietnam!
Investors in Thailand like Union Oil, Union Carbide, Kaiser, Castle 
and Cook, Bank of America, and U tah M ining and Construction 
are working through SRI for Project A G IL E , the Pentagon’s world­
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wide counterinsurgency research program  so that the United States 
will be in a knowledgeable position should “large-scale intervention 
in Thailand be called for” (SRI).
A nother factor is China. How long will she sit by and witness 
the extension of U.S. military power along her borders? M any of 
the leading corporations active in the Pacific are eager to trade 
with China. It galls them to have to watch the Japanese and W est 
Germans reaping profits from the enemy. But trade with China 
is unlikely to come while China sees larger and larger deployments 
of troops and bases on the Asian mainland. Further, China will 
undoubtedly continue to  support liberation struggles in adjacent 
countries.
Besides the pressures from outside, the developm ent of the Pacific 
Rim strategy is threatened from within, particularly by the complex 
relations between the U nited States and Japan. W hile the United 
States has fought in Southeast Asia in part to  secure the area for 
Japan, Japan  still rem ains a serious com petitor. In  Thailand until 
recently, for example, Japan  was the largest investor. Japan  is 
pursuing new m arkets aggressively; the director of Pacific operations 
for one of the largest Am erican firms in the area com m ented re­
cently that “little by little Japan  is taking over the Pacific” .
Japan ’s m ost serious th reat is in the U.S. domestic m arket in 
steel, autos, certain consum er goods and electronic components. 
The steel industry in particular is adam ant about imposing measures, 
whether higher tariffs o r quotas, which will cut down Japanese 
imports. M any corporations are caught in a dilemma. If the 
decline of the United States’ competitive position is a long-term 
trend due to  factors like inflation which cannot be controlled, they 
will have no choice but to  restrict imports.
U.S. corporations argue that they must restrict Japanese imports 
if Japan  is not willing to  reciprocate by opening the door to U.S. 
direct investments. Despite a recent token liberalisation policy, 
Japan  prevents Am erican corporations from  gaining control of 
Japanese firms or from  setting up subsidiaries by limiting U.S. 
investment to  joint ventures controlled by Japanese capital and to 
stock m arket investment. The United States is eager to  compete 
equally within (read dom inate) the Japanese economy by setting 
up its own operations and purchasing Japanese firms. If the 
United States is allowed to  Americanise the Japanese economy as 
it has the European, Japan, with its fantastic rate of growth, could 
become the m ajor m arket for U.S. capital.
Faced by a variety of pressures from the United States, Japan 
might em bark on a m ore independent course. She is already
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arming herself with destroyers, subs and American jets at the urging 
of the United States. It is forseeable that she might decide in the 
future that she can exist without living under the United States' 
nuclear umbrella, particularly if she has more amicable relations 
with countries like China who will rem ain hostile as long as Japan 
serves as an outpost for U.S. military adventures. The conse­
quences of splitting with the United States cannot be taken lightly. 
Besides the benefits of imperialism without militarism, Japan would 
lose the annual “ subsidy” from U.S. military expenditures in Japan 
and perhaps some of the benefits of military expenditure outside 
of Japan. Japan would have to be pushed quite a ways by a 
strong trend toward protectionism in the United States and more 
adam ant attem pts to open the door before any fundamental change 
would take place. The seeds of the conflict do exist, however, 
and they are growing.
Finally there are the political liabilities of an alliance with the 
United States. Japan is aware that subordination to the United 
States means inability to break out of the cycle of involvement in 
U.S. military adventures, a distinct problem for an Asian nation 
with a large, militant left. The United States and the Mutual 
Security Treaty which allows the United States to have bases in 
Japan  have been a target of the left for years. M ilitant action 
against the huge U.S. base on Okinaw a has increased in the last 
3car with the return of the island to Japan  as a goal. The Japanese 
and the U.S. mission seem to be in agreem ent at this point that a 
return of the base to Japan might be a good way to “manage” the 
confrontation which is anticipated for next year when the treaty is 
scheduled to be renewed. If the left can exert greater pressure 
on the government in the impending crisis, it may force the govern­
ment to take a more independent stand. The return of Okinawa 
and several small bases would not represent an Am erican pull-out 
to a defence perim eter in the Philippines and Guam. Most esti­
mates arc that if the United States can afford to give up the base 
in Okinawa, it will be transferred to Cam Ranh Bay.
What alternatives does corporate imperialism have in Asia? 
W ithdrawal or significant disengagement simply are not feasible 
given the nature of American expansion to the East. Since 1945 
the United States has “ invested” billions of dollars in aid and 
m aterial and tens of thousands of lives in three wars (the Chinese 
civil war and the Korean and Vietnamese interventions) in order 
to m aintain a presence on the Asian mainland. This fact alone 
should be indicative of U.S. intentions.
But now the corporations at the forefront of planning the Pacific 
Rim strategy are taking themselves further into a situation where
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there is less and less room to manoeuvre. Having constructed the 
southern flank of a perm anent defence perim eter with its major 
bases at Cam Ranh Bay and in northern Thailand, they have defined 
the area immediately behind this perim eter beginning in Thailand 
and including Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia as vital to the 
existence of their leading ally, Japan, and as integral and essential 
to the entire Pacific Basin. The Basin in turn has been defined as 
essential to the future development of international capitalism 
because of its raw materials and its vast potential.
The propensity of the system to penetrate and attem pt to incor­
porate larger and larger areas has generated an epic struggle 
against imperialism, the beginnings of which we are just witnessing. 
When we examine the liberation struggles in other Asian countries, 
we ought to rem em ber that the Chinese fought for more than two 
decades for their independence and that the Vietnamese have been 
tighting now for almost three. These struggles will smoulder, 
rekindle, and flare up according to their own rhythm s but they 
have reached the stage where their expansion is inevitable.
The central role of arm ed counter-revolution in U.S. imperialism 
in Asia is probably the most im portant short term factor governing 
the United States’ ability to extricate itself from Vietnam. The 
negotiations are influenced by the United States’ intent to maintain 
a perm anent military presence in Southeast Asia. The military 
cannot “liberate” Vietnam. It remains to be seen if they can 
hold on to  the enclaves. But they will not accept anything short 
of this.
Finally the economic consequences of a significant reduction of 
the U.S. military presence would be severe, if not disastrous. The 
economies of the Asian countries oriented toward the West have 
grown in dependency on expenditures generated by American 
interventions. If Japan  would suffer from a m ilitary cut-back, 
the impact on less developed countries like Korea, Taiwan or 
Singapore would undoubtedly be more severe. Once committed 
to the generation of significant economic developm ent by means of 
military expenditures it has become close to impossible to take 
a peaceful course even if the various liberation fronts would allow 
it.
vVith the United States operating on the basis of the assumptions 
which have shaped the Pacific Rim strategy, the Paris talks do 
not indicate a dram atic reversal in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed 
they are simply a ploy to buy time to cool out dissent a t home 
while continuing the disastrous policies of the postwar period in 
Asia.
